Estate Planning

Jacobson v. Jacobson (2022) clarified standing requirements in estate litigation. The Maryland appellate court held that a disinherited niece lacked standing to challenge estate planning documents on grounds of undue influence because she was no longer a beneficiary and was not an heir at law. The case established that a prior or speculative interest in an estate is insufficient to bring a legal challenge without a current or legally recognized financial interest.

Shump v. Wannall (2016) held that a residuary clause directing assets to a trust was invalid because the referenced trust was not created simultaneously with the will. The Maryland court strictly interpreted the applicable statute, ruling that a trust established three weeks after the will did not satisfy the requirement for a valid pour-over provision. The case underscores the importance of strict compliance with procedural requirements in estate planning.

Vito v. Grueff (2017) held that a trust’s general modification clause does not automatically give beneficiaries the power to remove another beneficiary. The Maryland Supreme Court ruled that three beneficiaries could not use a 75% approval provision to eliminate a fourth beneficiary because doing so conflicted with the settlor’s clear intent that all four children benefit equally from the trust. The case emphasizes that settlor intent controls trust interpretation and that beneficiary removal powers must be expressly granted.

In re Estate of Duraiswamy (2026) addressed whether a surviving partner in an alleged common law marriage could inherit from an intestate estate. The Maryland appellate court upheld the finding that no valid common law marriage existed because the required elements under D.C. law were not proven. As a result, the surviving partner's estate could not claim a share of the decedent's estate. The case underscores the importance of establishing a legally recognized marital relationship when seeking inheritance rights in the absence of a will.

Godette v. Estate of Cox (1991) held that a testator cannot shield a personal representative from fiduciary liability through an exculpatory clause in a will. The D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that personal representatives remain subject to fiduciary duties and court oversight, regardless of language attempting to limit accountability. The court also reaffirmed that executors must properly document expenses and obtain approval for distributions, with the burden on the representative to show that estate funds were used for legitimate purposes.

Estate of Liles (1981) addressed implied revocation of a will following divorce. The D.C. Court of Appeals held that a property settlement agreement executed as part of a divorce created a presumption that the testator intended to revoke an earlier will benefiting the former spouse, even though no formal revocation occurred. The case established that divorce-related agreements can, under certain circumstances, operate as an implied revocation of testamentary provisions favoring an ex-spouse.

Wagman v. Lee (1983) and In re Estate of Randall (2010) clarified important aspects of D.C. trust and estate law. Wagman established that escrow agents can owe fiduciary duties and may face punitive damages for breaching those obligations. Randall held that a marriage affected by a spouse’s mental incapacity is voidable, not automatically void, allowing the surviving spouse to retain inheritance rights when the decedent died before an annulment was completed.

In re Estate of Bates (2008) addressed the removal of a personal representative based on allegations of estate mismanagement. A beneficiary sought the removal of the representative after she authorized the sale of estate real estate, arguing that the decision harmed her interests. The court rejected the request, holding that disagreement with a representative’s decisions or adverse effects on a beneficiary are not sufficient grounds for removal. The case reaffirmed that removing a personal representative requires substantial evidence of serious misconduct, incapacity, or other statutory grounds.

In re Estate of Grealis (2006) held that an attorney who received a privately funded retainer for legal services related to a guardianship was not required to return those funds or obtain prior court approval. The appellate court ruled that privately negotiated payments from non-estate sources were permissible, emphasizing that requiring court preapproval would place unnecessary burdens on the legal system and could discourage attorneys from accepting guardianship and estate-related matters. The case provides important guidance on attorney compensation in fiduciary and probate proceedings.

Several Maryland trust administration cases have shaped the legal framework governing trustee responsibilities, beneficiary rights, attorney liability, and appellate procedure. Noble v. Bruce established that beneficiaries generally cannot sue estate planning attorneys due to the strict privity rule. Bennett v. Gentile reaffirmed this principle by rejecting a beneficiary's attempt to invoke the third-party beneficiary exception. In the Matter of the Donald Edwin Williams Revocable Trust and the Individual Beneficiary Trust of Linda L. Slacum addressed appellate procedure in trust litigation, holding that certain rulings were not immediately appealable while other issues remained pending. Together, these cases provide important guidance on trust administration and trust-related disputes in Maryland.

In re Steiner (2022) addressed whether a codicil must contain an attestation clause to be valid under Maryland law. The testator executed a facially valid will and later signed a codicil, witnessed by two individuals and properly notarized, to modify certain beneficiary interests. Although the codicil lacked an attestation clause, the court held that it was still valid because Maryland law does not require an attestation clause for either a will or a codicil when the statutory execution requirements are otherwise satisfied. The decision reinforced the presumption of validity for properly executed testamentary documents and further clarified Maryland’s attestation requirements.

Slack v. Truitt (2002) examined whether a will could be invalidated when witnesses later claimed they did not know they were signing a will. Although one witness testified that she believed she was signing a neighborhood petition rather than a testamentary document, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the will remained valid because it was facially compliant with all statutory execution requirements. The court emphasized that a properly executed will carries a presumption of validity, and a witness’s later recollection or lack of subjective intent is generally insufficient to overcome that presumption. The case underscores the importance of legal presumptions in probate law and reinforces Maryland’s focus on objective compliance with will-execution formalities.

Maryland’s law on will attestation has been shaped by a series of judicial decisions defining the requirements for witness signatures, testator signatures, and attestation clauses. Brengle v. Tucker reinforced the state's strict two-witness requirement, while Shane v. Wooley established that witness signatures must be properly affixed to the will. Slack v. Truitt held that a witness's later claim of lacking intent to sign a will does not defeat an otherwise validly executed document. Comrades v. Heller recognized that an imperfect testator signature may still be sufficient if the testator’s intent is clear. In re Steiner further clarified that attestation clauses are generally not required for a valid will or codicil, though their absence may invite closer judicial review. Together, these cases form an important foundation of Maryland’s attestation law.

Western Maryland College v. McKinstry (1892) involved a testator who wrote a will on the last page of a Bible, clearly expressing her intent to leave $5,000 to Western Maryland College, but failed to obtain the required witness signatures. The court held that despite the testator’s clear intent and mental capacity, the lack of witnesses rendered the will invalid under Maryland law. The decision reinforced the principle that strict compliance with statutory will-execution requirements is essential and that testamentary intent alone cannot overcome technical defects. As a result, the decedent was treated as having died intestate.

Woodstock College v. Hankey (1917) addressed whether a witness’s later testimony regarding a testator’s alleged lack of mental capacity could invalidate a facially valid will. Although one witness claimed the testator lacked capacity, the appellate court held that this testimony alone was insufficient to overcome the presumption of validity attached to a will that appeared to satisfy all legal requirements. The court also ruled that storing the will in an unsecured location did not affect its enforceability. The case reinforces Maryland’s principle that a properly executed will is presumed valid unless strong evidence demonstrates otherwise.

In re Lee’s Estate (1948) involved a hospitalized decedent whose will was placed inside a sealed envelope, while the two witnesses signed only the outside of the envelope. The court held that the will was invalid because the witness signatures were not properly affixed to the will itself, as required by law. Relying in part on Shane v. Wooley (1921), the court emphasized that strict compliance with statutory will-execution requirements is essential. The case illustrates how even minor technical defects can invalidate a will, highlighting the importance of following legal formalities when creating estate planning documents.