Why Estate Planning is Essential for All Generations

In Rudnick v. Rudnick (2023), a prenuptial agreement signed in 1992 became the subject of dispute during the couple's divorce in 2019. The agreement, which prohibited the division of assets or alimony, was initially considered fair but was deemed unconscionable at the time of enforcement. Massachusetts law, where the case arose, applied an unconscionability analysis at the time of enforcement. The courts ruled in favor of the wife, highlighting the importance of skilled legal representation well-versed in relevant state laws.

In Francis v. Francis (2024), the Maryland appellate court reaffirmed that veteran’s disability income is considered "actual income" under Maryland’s child support guidelines. Following a divorce, the father sought a modification to reduce his child support obligation, arguing that his veteran’s benefits shouldn't count as income.

This post explores the concept of fee simple determinable—a type of defeasible estate commonly used in estate planning to place conditional limits on property ownership. Unlike fee simple absolute, this interest automatically ends and reverts to a specified party if a condition is violated or a time frame lapses. By including precise grant language, Marylanders can ensure that real property is used for a specific purpose or transfers automatically under designated conditions.

The Mergner v. Estate of Mergner case underscores the binding nature of irrevocable trusts and marital property agreements in Maryland estate planning. The wife, who accepted nearly $450,000 in distributions from an irrevocable trust established by her husband, later sought to reclaim her right to an elective share despite having waived it in a marital property agreement.

In Mathew v. Mathew (2024), the Maryland appellate court addressed the issue of “Crawford credits” in property division during divorce. Although the husband was solely responsible for paying expenses on the marital home while having exclusive occupancy, his request for credit was denied because he made the payments with marital funds, meaning the wife already shared the financial burden.